(1) risk factors that promote piracy, (2) future hotspots for piratical behavior, and (3) the intent of pirates once cargo, vessel and crew are commandeered. Findings suggest that while the Northern and Southern African coasts do not appear to be a high risk area for future piracy, Eastern Africa remains a high threat area primarily due to Somalia. On the opposite coast, Western Africa will likely continue to experience some degree of piracy primarily in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but at a manageable level consistent with current trends. The Northwestern region of the continent however, appears to pose the highest risk for piracy, including the countries of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria. Recommendations regarding the strategic role for the U.S. Navy in helping curtail piracy off the continent of Africa are offered.
SAILING INTO TROUBLED WATERS: PREDICTING PIRACY OFF AFRICA
For centuries piracy has been an occupational hazard for seamen navigating the waters off the coast of Africa. As early as the 16 th century Africa served as a hub for pirate activity, preying upon the cargo and crew of merchant vessels transiting nearby shipping routes. Over the centuries numerous advances in navigation and communication have helped make seafaring safer. However, these technological advances also benefited pirates in many respects. Today's ships are capable of carrying significantly larger payloads with fewer crewmembers, making them even more lucrative catches and vulnerable targets for modern day pirates.
Piracy has many historical roots within the continent of Africa. Over 500 years ago the Barbary States of Northern Africa (i.e., Algiers, Libya, Tunisia) provided operational bases for pirates raiding merchant vessels transiting the Mediterranean.
Over the years the threat of these pirate activities was so detrimental to United States (U.S.) trade that in 1795 President George Washington signed a treaty agreeing to pay a tribute of over $1 million to the Barbary pirates in exchange for safe passage of U.S.
flagged vessels. 1 This maritime threat to our nation's trade did not end until1801 when the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps attacked pirate safe havens in Tripoli during the Barbary Wars.
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Over the last decade piracy has made a resurgence off the coasts of Africa, especially along its Northeastern coast. From January to September of 2010, Somali pirates alone were responsible for 127 attacks in the Gulf of Aden and wider Indian
Ocean area, 682 crew were held hostage, 12 injured and 1 killed. 3 As of December 31 st Somali pirates were holding 25 vessels and 601 crewmembers for ransom, and just recently killed 4 Americans after hijacking their private yacht. 4 Hence, while sea travel has continued to become safer throughout the centuries, the threats and dangers of piracy on the high seas are as real for mariners today as it was for their ancestors.
Piracy has its roots in ancient times ever since civilizations first used maritime vessels to transport goods between neighboring states. Consequently, the law of piracy is regarded as one of the oldest branches of international law with written legal references dating back over a millennium. 5 Today, the United Nations (U.N.)
Convention on Law of the Sea (LOS) defines piracy as:
…any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed to: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
6
Given the inherent threat and associated dangers of piracy, it is incumbent upon any naval vessel regardless of nationality to render aid to maritime ships under attack outside of a country's territorial waters (12 Access to Shipping Routes. Perhaps one of the most important prerequisites for piracy to occur is for a nation to be proximate to major maritime shipping routes.
Current estimates are that over 90% of internationally traded goods are transported by sea, with most of these goods flowing through international maritime shipping routes.
These shipping routes highlighted in Figure 1 below are similar to commercial airways in many respects, in that they are typically only several miles in width and carry the majority of the world's trade. The two primary shipping routes around Africa are by either transiting through the Suez Canal, or circumnavigating the continent's western coastline around the Cape of Good Hope. As highlighted in Table 1 , only 22 of the 33
African coastal nations are situated proximate to major maritime shipping lanes.
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Countries with direct access to shipping routes by region include to the North (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara), Northwest (Benin, Cote D'Ivorie, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo), West (none), South (South Africa) and East (Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia).
Bab-el-Mandeb strait.
Figure 1. Geographical Regions and International Shipping Routes 13
Choke Points. A second important risk factor that abets piratical activity is a natural chokepoint. Chokepoints are locations within shipping routes that cannot be easily bypassed and naturally limit the ability of a ship to maneuver and transit. Hence, any alternative to navigating through a chokepoint requires the ship to either detour, or use an alternative route, which typically incurs additional financial costs and/or delays.
14 From a pirate's perspective whenever shipping routes are constrained by natural barriers or choke points, vessels become extremely vulnerable given they must typically reduce speed while having limited maneuverability. Rerouting ships to bypass this choke point would require sailing around the Western coast of Africa, and that would add an additional 3000 miles and several weeks transit time. Rerouting would result in additional fuel costs estimated at $3.5 million per year for tankers and $74.4 million for liner trades. 16 When analyzing this alternative from the perspective of a cost-benefit analysis, it is more cost effective for shipping companies to continue transporting goods through the Suez Canal risking piracy, while incurring higher insurance premiums to cover the increased risk associated with this route. In turn, maritime insurance companies have reaped significant profits by raising insurance premiums ($10,000 -$20,000 per trip) for all shipping operations within pirated waters. These premiums have more than offset the costs of actual claims paid out ($500,000 -$2 million) for ransoming crew, cargo and vessels, given less than 1% of all shipping is successfully attacked. Ability to Protect Territorial Waters. Directly related to the size of a nation's coastline, is the number and quality of naval assets the country possesses that enable it to conduct maritime law enforcement operations. Countries with large coastlines and limited naval assets will find it extremely challenging to deter piracy given the vast amount of ocean they need to patrol. However, even nations with a small swath of coastline and limited naval assets will find it all but impossible to patrol their waters adequately. Table 1 However, illegal fishing is also conducted within many African nations' waters since many countries lack sufficient Navy or Coast Guard forces to protect their territorial waters. This has had a significant impact upon local fisherman, and is believed to have drawn many otherwise honest seamen into piracy as a means of survival. through the use of firearms alone. 26 Demographic Theory posits that countries with disproportionate numbers of young men experience the highest rates of crime and violence. More specifically when the ratio of post adolescent young men to older men reaches a ratio of 40:100 or approximately 30%, violent conflict tends to ensue within a society. 27 These risk factors are exacerbated if the country is experiencing high levels of unemployment given joblessness among young men is traditionally greater than any other age group, with estimates ranging from three to five times higher than older adult males. 28 Aggravating matters further is that researchers allege that young men engaging in armed conflict within many African nations has begun to serve as a societal rite of passage into manhood. 29 
Access to Small Arms and Light

Predicting Piracy Off Africa
A risk analysis for piracy off Africa was conducted for each country and geographical region using each of the eight variables or risk factors previously discussed. Table 1 Western Africa. While Western Africa does experience some degree of piracy, it does not appear to be at-risk for high levels of piracy in the near future. The Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) has displayed the highest levels of piracy in the region and displays a number of risk factors (e.g., critical for becoming a failed state and no substantive naval assets) but has a limited 37 km coast line. Moreover along with the other countries in this region it is located a significant distance from international shipping routes. Hence, while this region is likely to continue experiencing some degree of piracy in the future, it should remain at a manageable level.
Southern Africa. Over the past several years none of the countries in the Southern region have experienced piracy, and it does not appear that this region is likely to become a high risk in the near future. The one country that poses the greatest concern is Mozambique, which has a vast coastline to protect (2470 km) with relatively modest naval assets, if any. However, the major shipping routes bypass its coastline heading to Asia (see Figure 1) , and there have only been a handful of piracy incidents reported in this area over the past six years.
Other Trends in African Piracy
The objective of most African pirates is not to capture vessels or cargo for resale, but instead to hold captured crews, cargo and vessels for ransom. Negotiations are typically conducted by a third party who has no direct connection to the pirates. 36 According to Stephen Carmel the Senior Vice President of the Maersk Line shipping company, "Somali pirates are a pure hostage for ransom crowd. That means among other things that the hostages always get released and generally are not horribly mistreated." 37 The recent increase in hostage ransoms paid which have been purported to be in the range of $7 to $9.5 million, has made piracy a very profitable business.
However, one second order effect of these increased ransom payoffs has been a significant increase in the duration hostages are now being held. In the last year alone, hostages went from being held an average of 55 days in 2009, to 100 days in 2010 in hopes of negotiating larger ransoms. 38 While African piracy involves numerous actors, the primary players are the gangs actually conducting the illegal operations. For instance, in Somalia the majority of pirates are affiliated with organized gangs, each of which is typically associated with a particular clan located in a specific geographical locale along the country's 1,900 mile coastline. While the Hoboyo-Haradhere cartel operating out of El-Huur and El-Gaan is one of the largest gangs (>100 skiffs), there are at least a half dozen other pirate clan based gangs operating from various Somalia seaports, including Eyl, Garard, Bosasso, Ras Asir, Alula Cape and Chismayu. 39 However, given the recent large payoffs in ransom by insurance companies, piracy in Africa is likely to draw the interest of transnational criminal organizations. The combinations of dire economic conditions, armed conflicts, state inefficiencies and weak governance have made the African region especially vulnerable to organized crime. 40 Transnational crime syndicates are currently involved in a wide range of illicit commodities in Africa, including diamonds, human trafficking, narcotics, petroleum, ivory and weapons. 41 Given the limited resources Africa has in combating organized crime, the opportunities for such organizations to exploit cash lucrative opportunities such as piracy is very high. For instance, Africa currently has only 180 police officers per 100,000 people on the continent, which is approximately half that found in Asia. In addition, police are typically underpaid and susceptible to corruption, creating an inviting atmosphere for organized crime. 42 All of these conditions make Africa a very lucrative market for transnational organized crime to engage in piracy. In addition, transnational criminal organizations would also benefit in the event insurance companies begin refusing to pay ransoms as they would be more should be willing to wage war when vital interests are threatened. In contrast, secondary interests are typically removed from the nation's borders and represent no threat to sovereignty. 44 A dilemma that Morgenthau warns of is when secondary interests become popularized by statesmen or public opinion to the point that they become misconstrued and appear to be vital interests. 45 This can result in military action even though such action is not warranted.
When assessing piracy in relation to U.S. interests, the 2005 U.S. National
Maritime Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of maintaining "freedom of the seas." However, the specific discussion of piracy is limited to its capabilities and threats in support of terrorist activities and organizations. 46 In fact, President Obama's 2010
National Security Strategy states that the U.S. needs to actively pursue four enduring national interests including: (a) security of the U.S., its citizens, allies and partners, (b) prosperity to ensure a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy, (c) respect for universal values around the world, and (d) international order advanced by U.S.
leadership to promote peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. 47 To date African piracy does not directly threaten any vital U.S. national interests, nor does it have a significant impact on the U.S. economy. In retrospect, less than 2% of our nation's commerce is carried by U.S. flagged ships, and only 13% of our oil imports come from this region of the world. 48 Given less than 1% of all vessels traveling through these waters are subject to piracy, the actual risk to U.S. interests by African piracy is extremely low. Even shipping companies have argued that African piracy is not a significant concern to maritime trade. The estimated annual cost of piracy in the region is estimated to be between $7 and $12 billion worldwide. 49 However, from the perspective of the shipping industry this "…represents the value of cargo that flows through that area every hour, a rounding error considering the total value of maritime trade, so is in reality nothing the system could not adapt to." 50 Hence, at this time African Piracy does not constitute a significant threat to maritime trade, nor does it pose a credible threat to U.S. vital interests despite the media coverage sensationalizing such incidents. Therefore, military action utilizing kinetic strikes against land targets which may risk second and third order effects potentially escalating regional conflict does not appear to be prudent. Taking this into consideration recommendations for the U.S.
Navy policy should include operations focusing on prevention, counterpiracy, and prosecution. A brief discussion of each is provided.
Piracy Prevention. Traditionally counterpiracy efforts have focused on thwarting these activities at sea. Unfortunately, this is a generally ineffective strategy given piracy is merely an outgrowth of a country's land based malaise. In addition, international efforts to reduce piracy appear to have focused on a punishment based approach (e.g., capture and prosecute) toward the pirates themselves. Critics commonly argue that any cost benefit analysis for patrolling 356,000 km of African coastline with Navy warships in search of teenage pirates in skiffs would be excessively costly, ineffective and ludicrous.
An effective counterpiracy response needs to address both the root cause of the problem as well as its symptoms. 51 Counterpiracy efforts need to provide a balanced economic and behavioral approach of reward and punishment to shape both a country and its citizen's behavior. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, its court system has quickly become inundated. Recently Kenya announced that it will no longer continue to prosecute pirates outside its territorial waters unless it receives additional international funding. 55 Most recently the U.S. has begun trying pirates, and has convicted its first pirates in nearly two centuries in both New York and Virginia federal Courts. 56 
Conclusion
While the media continues to garner international attention regarding the impending piracy crisis off the coast of Africa, it is important to remember that African piracy does not currently pose a threat to vital U.S. national interests. The majority of all commercial trade through the pirated waters of Africa is intended for Asia. As
Morgenthau warned, secondary national interests should not be misconstrued as vital interests merely due to publicity. African piracy is a secondary interest for the United
States, and merits a proportional response to help contain its effects on international trade and help maintain regional stability. Hence, while it is important for the U.S. to help combat piracy and prevent such behaviors from escalating in the region, this is inherently an international problem that calls for an international solution. Findings from this study suggest the Northern and Southern African coasts do not appear to be a high risk for future piracy, while Eastern Africa remains a high threat area primarily due to Somalia. On the opposite coast, Western Africa will likely continue to experience some degree of piracy primarily in Cameroon and Democratic Republic of Congo, but at a manageable level consistent with current trends. However, the Northwestern region of the continent appears to pose the highest risk for piracy, including the countries of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Nigeria. The U.S. Navy's continued support of counter piracy operations and prosecution efforts, while simultaneously promoting the development of small but effective maritime security forces can help mitigate the risks of African piracy increasing and becoming a regional security situation.
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